Written by László Ropolyi
The typical variants of philosophy of science can be basically characterized on their view on the question what science is. Answering this question three main contexts has been applied in the philosophy of science: a logical-linguistic, a social, and a life-world context. According to the logical-linguistic context the science can be considered as a specific set of sentences; in the social context the science is a kind of social prod, while in the context of life-world the science is a result of special human efforts. These contexts are dominantly applied in the so-called analytic, social constructivist and hermeneutic versions of philosophy of science. An additional possibility of classification of philosophies of science can be based on the further characterization of the contexts. According to some views the above mentioned contexts (logical, social and life-world systems) are given as stable entities, but in some other views these contexts can be changed during the scientific activity. This means that based on these meta-methodological principles we can distinguish six typical variants of philosophy of science: analytic, social constructivist and hermeneutic approaches, but each of them can use its relevant “passive” or “active” context, too. And, of course, we can reject any relevant established context for identification of the sciences – applying an anarchist epistemology and showing up a seventh tradition in philosophy of science. Decisions about the application of the above contexts can be based on accepted or rejected philosophical ideas, theories on society, views about the human nature – in general an accepted cultural position.
These seven typical versions of philosophy of science represent the mainstream styles of thinking on science. Our classification is based on general principles, so it is insensible to the individual views of philosophers, but it is a useful tool for comparative analyses. The additional two central questions (How does science work? How does it change?) have also important role in this characterization of the individual philosophers of science and contribute to the proper classification of their views.
Such a metaphilosophical analysis of the historical versions of philosophy of science can show the coexisting components within them. For example in the case of Kuhn or Lakatos it is easy to demonstrate that their views overlap in a specific way the above classes. On the other hand using these views we can contribute to the analysis of the history and philosophy of SSK, STS, cultural studies, and another similar descriptions of the scientific sphere.